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BLD-068        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-3368 
 ___________ 
 
ROBERT E. CHAMBERS, II, Appellant 
 
v. 
 
JUDGE RITA HATHAWAY;  
OFFICER GARY SCHUBERT;  
OFFICER WAGNER;  
SERGEANT LAPORTE  
____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 1-08-cv-00352) 
 Magistrate Judge:  Honorable Susan Paradise Baxter 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
 or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
December 16, 2010 
 
Before:   SLOVITER, JORDAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit 
 
Judges 
 (Opinion filed: January 4, 2011) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
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PER CURIAM 
 
 Robert E. Chambers, a Pennsylvania prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from the 
dismissal of his complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6).   Because the appeal 
presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm. 
 Chambers filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendant 
Judge Hathaway “violated [his] due process by putting a stay out of New Ken., Arnold, 
and Lower Burrell order on [his] sentencing paperwork. . .” Complaint at Section IV.C.  
He further claimed that Defendants Schubert, Wagner, and LaPorte (“Police 
Defendants”) violated his Fourth Amendment rights by conducting an allegedly improper 
search and seizure.  Chambers sought monetary relief as well as “immediate relief or re-
sentencing based on evidence.” Complaint at VI. 1
 Concurrently with his § 1983 complaint, Chambers petitioned the District Court 
for a writ of habeas corpus.   That petition, in which Chambers raised nearly identical 
claims, was denied.  There, the District Court noted that the stay-out “order” was no more 
than a recommendation—in fact, Defendant Judge Hathaway herself acknowledged on 
Chambers’ state appeal that: “the inclusion in any sentencing order involving a maximum 
period of incarceration of two years or more of language regarding a condition of parole 
is but a recommendation or suggestion only, and is clearly not mandatory or enforceable 
unless made a special condition of parole by the [Pennsylvania Board of Probation and 
  
                                              
1 By consent of the parties, the matter was adjudicated by United States Magistrate 
Judge Susan Paradise Baxter. 
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Parole].”  Chambers v. Attorney Gen.
 To the extent, if any, that Chambers’ intent in this civil rights action was to 
invalidate some part of the sentence imposed by the trial court, he cannot do so. 
, No. 2:08-cv-01703, 2009 WL 605885, at *4 (W.D. 
Pa. Mar. 9, 2009), appeal dismissed as untimely, CA No. 09-2522 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 
2009). 
Heck v. 
Humphrey. 512 U.S. 477 (1994); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973).  As noted, 
Chambers has unsuccessfully appealed his sentence through the state courts and his 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied on its merits.  Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 
(“when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider 
whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his 
conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff 
can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated”).  However 
there are aspects of Chambers’ claims that would not lie in habeas or implicate the 
validity of his sentence.  For instance, as to the stay-out “order,” which, as we have 
noted, was no more than a recommendation, Chambers indicates that his concern is with 
the mental anguish he suffered upon hearing the “order.”2
Chambers’ claim that the Police Defendants committed an illegal search and 
seizure of his person is also not barred by 
   
Heck
                                              
2 In the argument Chambers filed in support of this appeal, he claims that this 
order has caused him to be concerned throughout his incarceration about possible 
release conditions.  He further alleges mental anguish arising from the necessity of 
explaining to his worried children that he will, in fact, likely be unable to return 
.  Chambers averred that the inculpatory 
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evidence the Police Defendants recovered was not found on his person but rather from 
some other area.  Complaint at IV.C.  Because Chambers does not claim that the search 
and seizure of his person produced evidence used against him at trial, his claim does not 
implicate the validity of his sentence.  See Heck
Defendant Judge Hathaway moved to dismiss the complaint, citing both absolute 
judicial immunity and 
, 512 U.S. at 487 n.7. 
Heck
 The Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that Defendant Judge Hathaway is 
immune from suit for any civil rights violation under the doctrine of absolute judicial 
immunity.  Judge Hathaway was acting within her judicial capacity and within her 
jurisdiction when she made the statements that allegedly caused Chambers’ anguish and 
is therefore immune from suit.  
.  The Police Defendants moved to dismiss Chambers’ claims 
against them as barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations.  Chambers did 
not respond to either of these motions, and instead filed a motion for summary judgment. 
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1978).3
                                                                                                                                                  
home after his sentence.  
   
3 The Magistrate Judge’s also relied upon the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  Because 
Chambers did not seek to “appeal” from the state court to the District Court, but 
instead sought to argue a new constitutional claim, the doctrine is inapplicable.  
See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005); Great 
W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 163-70 (3d Cir. 
2010).  Given how Chambers presents his claim, we doubt he is–as the Magistrate 
Judge thought–actually seeking prospective injunctive relief as to Judge 
Hathaway.  We stress in any event that the judge’s comments, even if construed as 
Chambers evidently construes them,  in no way amounted to a due process 
violation.  Cf. DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 612 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Standing 
alone, simple verbal harassment does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, 
deprive a prisoner of a protected liberty interest or deny a prisoner equal 
protection of the laws”). 
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The Magistrate judge was also correct to dismiss Chambers’ claims against the 
Police Defendants because the statute of limitations had already elapsed at the time his 
complaint was filed.  A two-year statute of limitations is applied to § 1983 claims brought 
in Pennsylvania.  Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010) (“A section 
1983 claim is characterized as a personal-injury claim and thus is governed by the 
applicable state's statute of limitations for personal-injury claims”) (citing Wallace v. 
Kato
 As the appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm the 
judgment below.  
, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007));  42 Pa. Con. Stat. § 5524 (requiring that personal injury 
actions be commenced within two years).  Here, the allegedly unconstitutional actions by 
the Police Defendants occurred on July 3, 2006. Complaint at IV.C.  Chambers filed this 
suit in December 2008—well outside the applicable limitations period.  
See
 
 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4 and 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.  
 
